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Agricultural Marketing Boards and Induced Voting Behavior
Jonathan Cave and Stephen W. Salant
The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937 permits the establishment of
committees that, among other activities, may legally regulate industry sales
for the benefit of producers. Unlike other cartels operating in the United
States, these committees are exempt from antitrust penalties. Indeed, the
federal government itself polices each agreement, punishing those who
violate committee edicts.
Since more than half of the fruits and tree nuts and 15 percent of the
vegetables produced in the United States, measured in value terms, are
regulated by such committees, it seems important to understand their
behavior. Figure 8.1 indicates crops currently regulated by such federal
orders. Since 1937 hundreds of orders have been initiated; most have
terminated for one reason or another.' At the moment, forty-seven dif-
ferent federal orders exist. Of these, twenty-four provide for some form of
direct regulation of quantity. The rest purportedly regulate quality. Of the
twenty-four containing quantity regulations, only a handful are commonly
regarded as serious sources of resource misallocation: the orders for hops,
spearmint oil, walnuts, filberts, California-Arizona navel and valencia
oranges, and lemons. The rest are typically regarded as ineffective.2 Why
some quantity-restricting cartels are more effective than others is a puzzle
worthy of explanation.
Our goal in this research project is to understand the behavior of
administrative committees authorized to restrict volume. Understanding
this behavior is interesting in its own right and in addition may clarify how
other cartels operate. Like every cartel, these administrative committees
must.grapple with difficult collective choice problems; however, they are
not burdened with the enforcement problems that beset the typical cartel.
Administrative committees afford students of cartel behavior three advan-
tages: (1) their collective choice mechanism (majority-rule voting) is expli-
cit, (2) their meetings are open to the public, and (3) their public records
reveal how each committee member voted on each proposed volume
restriction (no matter whether it passed or failed).
The participants in these markets are consumers, growers. and inter-
mediaries referred to as handlers or packinghouses. To establish an order
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or a smaller number representing at least two-thirds of the volume).
Orders generally state in detail the number of board members of each
type (growers. handlers, or consumers) that growers and cooperatives can
nominate. For example, the valencia committee is composed of eleven
members-six growers, four handlers, and a consumer representative.
Three of the growers and two of the handlers can be nominated by
the cooperative that ships more than 50 percent of the crop (since time
immemorial, Sunkist). The remaining cooperatives can nominate (using
volume-weighted voting) one grower and one handler, whereas indepen-
dent growers can nominate the two other growers and one handler. The
eleventh member is selected by the other ten and must be neither a handler
nor a grower. Each member serves for a term of two years.
Committees range in size from six members (Colorado potatoes) to
forty-seven (raisins). Producers hold a majority on forty committees and
have excluded handlers altogether on six committees.
Only the actions of the handlers are directly regulated by the committee's
decisions. Under a time-honored principle known as "equitable marketing
opportunity" (incorporated in sections 608 (c) (6) (C) and (D) of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937), all handlers are given the
opportunity to ship the same percentage of the crop under their control to
the regulated market, which we call the "primary" market. In practice,
however, some handlers do not avail themselves of this opportunity. The
divergence that typically exists between aggregate sales, on the one hand,
and aggregate allotments (the amount authorized by the committee), on
the other, is evidence that some handlers ship less than they are permitted.
Table 8.1 reflects this stylized fact.3 Why some handlers find it contrary
to their self-interest to sell on the regulated market as much as the com-
mittee gives them the "opportunity" to sell also merits explanation. How
handlers dispose of the rest of their crop depends on the specific order.
Orders in which the handler can dump the rest of his crop on unregulated
secondary markets are known as "market allocations" or "season-long
prorates." Currently in this category are cranberries, raisins, almonds,
walnuts, filberts California dates, oranges, and lemons. Orders in which
any production in excess of the allotment must be stored are known as
"producer allotments." Currently in this category are hops, spearmint oil,
and Florida celery.
In the next section of this chapter we review the standard model of
marketing orders and discuss anecdotal evidence inconsistent with it. In
subsequent sections, we develop an alternative model that, unlike the
conventional model, accounts explicitly for the divergent interests of corn-
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Table 6.1 Ilustration of divergence between aggregate allotments and sales, hops and
celery from 1960 to 1980
Season Florida celery( 1.000 cratesr Hops (1,000 Ib)
beginning Allotmneaab Sales Allotment Sales
1960C 7,086 d 45,652
1961 7,122 4 35,454
1962 7,132 4 44,072
1963 7,372 d°51,33
1964 C 7,5734 53,081
1965 8,055 7,770 4 56,060
1966 _ 7,887 7,350 56,173 54,620
1967 7,887 6,867 55,753 49,498
1968 7,887 6,997 51,497 43,733
1969 7,887 6,128 46,063 41,592
1970 7,887 7,174 48,208 45,619
1971 7,887 7,069 49,601 48,057
1972 8,372 7,366 49,377 52,463
1973 8,797 6,071 55,528 55,1 52
1974 8,354 6,475 60,270 57,796
1975 8,326 5,686 60,270 55,593
1976 9,223 5,529 60,270 57,538
1977 8,082 5,979 60,270 54,767
1978 8,433 7,941 60,270 55,424
1979 9,644 7,900 63,234 55,254
1980 8,601 5,700' 76,424 75,816
1981 78.280
Source: USDA Report No. 477, p. 40.
a. Sixty pounds per crate.
b. Quantity that may be sold in primary miarket outlets. Sales figures are f'or the primnary
market.
c. Order effective November 15, 1965.
d. Order effective July 22, 1966.
e. Preliminary.
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mittee members and the fact that these conflicts are reconciled by voting.
We clarify how the interest of each market participant depends on the
restrictions adopted. Then we illustrate that these "induced preferences"
need not be single-peaked even in the simplest of cases. Finally, we show
that under majority rule the committee will nevertheless select the restric-
tion most preferred by the board member with the median endowment.
This chapter constitutes the theoretical underpinning of an ongoing re-
search project.
The Standard Model of the Monolithic Marketing Board and Some
Anecdotal Evidence against It
For decades agricultural marketing boards have been the subject of exten-
sive study by economists, consumer groups, and government officials. The
literature that has arisen concerning these cartels is vast.' In some cases it
consists of comprehensive analyses of the weekly meetings of specific
boards. For the most part, however, it consists of more formal, stylized
models of board behavior.
These latter treatments tend to analyze the producer allotment and
market allocation schemes by means of the same two models.' Producer
allotments tend to be viewed as classic monopolies. Each committee is
assumed to market whatever quantity maximizes industry profit. For
example, if sale of the entire crop would cause losses at the margin, it is
predicted that surplus will be discarded until the profit from an additional
sale is zero. Market allocation is regarded as classic third-degree price
discrimination coupled with free entry. Under this model the committee
restricts sales in the inelastic primary market to the point where marginal
revenues (net of any market-specific marginal handling costs) are equal in
the primary and secondary markets. Since the entitlement to sell in the
lucrative primary market is proportional to the size of one's crop, aggre-
gate crop size is predicted to expand (in markets where expansion is
permitted) until the losses in the secondary market offset the profits in the
primary market, and total profits are dissipated.
Although this conventional view has a great deal of support among
economists modeling volume-restricting marketing orders, we believe it is
erroneous. The standard view fails to consider that each allotment percen-
tage is chosen not by a benevolent dictator but by a committee operating
under majority rule. If committee participants vote according to their
divergent economic interests, the outcome of the voting process may differ
J. Cave and S. W. Salant 260
radically from the predictions of the conventional model. In an industry
of handlers of varying size, a committee dominated by small handlers,
for example, can be expected to make a different collective decision than
a committee composed of large handlers. The large handlers will favor tight
restrictions on all fellow handlers to limit free riding. In contrast, the small
handlers will prefer lax restrictions on every handler since they can depend
on the larger handlers to hold up the "price umbrella" by restricting their
own output even if not required by the committee to do so.
The more institution-oriented students of marketing orders have fre-
quently emphasized that committee decisions are compromises that recon-
cile deep-seated divisions within a given industry. To illustrate, consider
the citrus industry. The divisions within that industry were apparent even
before the inception of any order. The largest cooperative (now Sunkist)
had restricted sales in the inelastic market in an attempt to price discri-
minate. but it had failed repeatedly to get the needed cooperation of the
smaller handlers and the smaller cooperative (now Pure Gold). Sunkist's
problem with free riders was conveniently resolved after 1933 by federal
regulations making noncompliance illegal, but, as can be imagined, the
imposition of the government order was bitterly opposed by the indepen-
dent handlers and Pure Gold. A half century later this conflict still smol-
ders. Within the last year, a group of independents succeeded in pressuring
the secretary of agriculture to suspend the navel order- to the great dismay
of Sunkist.'
Size differences among market participants account for much of the
conflict within the citrus industry.7 In his comprehensive review of twenty
years of weekly minutes of meetings of the orange board. Clodius (1950.
p. 327) commented on a dispute that was to become chronic:
[Pure Gold] also criticized the level at which their weekly allotments were placed
by the committee, holding that they always had customers who were willing to buy
more of their oranges, if only the level of volume proration had not been set so
low. From the viewpoint of any shipper who controls such a small part of the total
supply, the amount he ships does not have any effect on the price he receives. This
was the position of [Pure Gold] and the independents. Thus their criticisms of the
committee in this matter were understandable. Had all the small shippers been
permitted to ship what they wanted each week. these incremental supplies would
probably have had a substantial price reducing effect ... The program would fail
if for no other reason than that which caused the voluntary programs to fail-those
whose shipments were not being restricted gained disproportionately.
These conflicts within the industry played themselves out in the decisions
of the orange committee. Compromises were reached only after protracted
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leliberations. Clodius (1950, p. 308) reports that the independents, Pure-old, and Sunkist would begin each meeting with widely divergent recom-
nendations for the allotment percentage. "Rarely do the three coincide.
'hereupon the groups bargain until some kind of compromise is found
.." In fact, according to Clodius (1950, p. 158), on one occasion com-
)romise proved utterly impossible. In December 1941 the orange order
iad to be terminated because the board-then composed of an even
lumber of members and lacking a tie-breaking rule-became hopelessly
leadlocked.
Based on his careful examination of twenty years of such meetings,"lodius (1951, p. 1046) ultimately concluded:
short-run maximization is also not possible because of lack of homogeneity of
nterests within the composition of the Committee reflecting industry attitudes.
every decision of the Committee is a result of compromise among the domi-
iant shipper, which is a cooperative, a much smaller cooperative shipper, and the
)rivate shippers. Committee representatives tend to be prejudiced toward their
>wn organizations. Because of the great diversity among organizations, their
nterests rarely tend to coincide; thus joint maximization is impossible [our
:rnphasis].
What Clodius concluded about the orange committees,8 the National
commission on Food Marketing concluded about most other administra-
:ive committees. After discussing deep conflicts in most industries-in
arge part related to size differences-the commission (1966, p. 348) re-
'narked: "It is doubtful that the interests of those administering most
orders coincide to the extent that an order could be operated consistently,
.n a highly monopolistic manner."
Given the abundant evidence of widespread conflict within many ad-
rninistrative committees, we are skeptical of claims that they invariably act
"as if" to maximize industry profits. Indeed, in our view proponents of
such theories often tacitly admit that the conventional model does not
apply to all orders containing volume restrictions since they never apply
it to orders that they regard as somewhat competitive. Instead, at the outset
they disregard such cases an uninteresting and of no "policy relevance."9
We illustrate here an approach that we hope is applicable to the entire class
of volume-restricting orders, not just to an arbitrary subset. We find that
changes in the composition of the administrative committees and the rules
governing them will have predictable economic consequences that policy-
makers may wish to consider when deciding how to reform the current
system. In contrast, the conventional model suggests that such political
changes will have no economic effects whatsoever.
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Industry Equilibrium and Induced Preferences about the Allotment
Percentage
The formal model contains n firms-the packinghouses. Firm i has at its
disposal a total quantity qi-referred to here as an "endowment" and in
the trade as the "base." Handlers divide sale of their crop (regarded here
as homogeneous) between a primary and a secondary market. In the
primary market the demand curve is assumed to be relatively inelastic and
to depend on sales in that market only.'0 Demand in the secondary market
is assumed to be infinitely elastic at a price c. We have adopted these
demand assumptions because they (1) simplify our problem, (2) corre-
spond to the assumptions most often used in the literature on the alterna-
tive model of marketing orders, and (3) seem to reflect reality for certain
orders." Since production decisions are assumed to have taken place
previously, we treat production as an endowment and therefore have no
need to consider its costs. Of course c can be regarded as the opportunity
cost of sales in the primary market. In the case of producer allotments,
c = 0.12 For concreteness, we assume that the firms are numbered in
increasing order of size: q, < q2 < - -- < q. We denote by Q1 the aggregate
endowment of the smallest i firms: Q, =q, + --- + qi.
The marketing board sets the maximum proportion F of each firm's
endowment that may be sold on the primary market. The strategy of firm
i is a quantity y, Fq, to be sold on the primary market; the rest of i's
endowment (qi - yi) is sold on the secondary market. The profit of the ith
firm will generally depend on its arrangement with its growers. If the
packinghouse is a cooperative, it retains a percentage of the revenues and
remits the remainder to the growers in proportion to the size of their crops.
For simplicity, we assume this form of contractual relationship below.'3
Hence the ith handler will want to maximize revenues from the primary
and secondary markets:





Denote aggregate sales in the primary market by Y (-=yi + Y.,). If y, is a
best reply to Y-1, one of the following Kuhn-Tucker conditions must hold:
y=0 and P(Y)-c<0, (1)
Agricultural Marketing Boards and Induced Voting Behavior 263
5e[0,qiFJ and P(Y)+yP'(Y)-c=0, or (2)
= qiF and P(Y)+ qiFP'(Y) - c>0. (3)
k pure-strategy Nash equilibrium point is an n-tuple of strategies
yi,... ,y,), each of which is a best reply to the others.
Under relatively mild assumptions it is possible to demonstrate the
xistence of a unique equilibrium point in pure strategies."4 Denote the
ector of equilibrium strategies by y*(F) and aggregate equilibrium pri-
nary market sales by Y*(F).
We now turn to the properties of this Nash equilibrium. Since demand
s strictly monotone decreasing, each handler's profit function is strictly
:oncave in its own decision variable (y;), 5 and only one of the Kuhn-
'ucker conditions (1) through (3) can hold for each i. To ensure that the
tandlers will wish to sell anything at all on the primary market, we assume
hat P(O) > c, which means that (1) does not hold for any i, provided F > 0.
'ince Y*(F) is unique, we can classify handlers as constrained or uncon-
trained at a given F. Firm i is constrained at F iff condition (3) holds for
irm i in the equilibrium associated with F; in that case we write i e C(F).
f not, (2) must hold, and we say that firm i is unconstrained at F; the set
>f unconstrained firms is denoted U(F).
If handler i is constrained, (3) holds and any smaller handler j(j < i)
nust also be constrained. If handler i is unconstrained, (2) holds, and any
arger handler j(j> i) must also be unconstrained. Thus C(F) and U(F)
tre intervals; there is a largest constrained handler i(F) such that C(F) =
1,...,i(F)} and U(F) = {i(F) + 1,...,n}.
The first-order condition characterizing the best reply of an uncon-
trained firm is symmetric. Hence all unconstrained firms i will sell the
ame quantity (denoted y"(F)) on the primary market, while each con-
trained firm will sell the maximum feasible amount (y*(F) = qiF).
The profits of firm i in the unique equilibrium corresponding to a
)articular F are
(n = ir(F)= P(Y*(F))y"(F)+ c(q - y"(F)) if ie U(F),
i)(F)= P(Y*(F))qiF+ c(l - F)q, if ie C(F),
where
Y*(F)= y,*(F)= y"(F)+ q.F.
imi e U(F) ieC(F)
['hese profits induce preferences of each firm over the choice of F. In turn
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the committee chooses F by simple majority rule, so we wish to relate the
chosen F to the structure of these preferences.
The induced preferences are not single peaked even in the simplest case,
where P(-) is linear. However, the collection of induced preferences has
enough structure to ensure the existence of a unique majority-rule equili-
brium to the voting game over F. We now clarify the elements of this
structure on which our results will depend.
The first element of this structure we refer to as nesting. Suppose that
we start with F = 1, in which case all firms are unconstrained. As F tightens
(falls), more and more firms become constrained. In fact, associated with
each firm i is a characteristic cutoff value F at which it just becomes
constrained (y"(F) = qF ). Our previous results imply that these cutoffs
are ranked in decreasing order of size: since q < --- < q,, it must be that
Fi > - - - > F,. If not, for i > j there would exist F between F and F; that
would constrain the larger firm (i) but not the smaller (j), and C(F) would
not be an interval. Therefore the nesting property implies that as F falls,
the smallest firms become constrained first, and firm i is constrained at F
if and only if F < F. This reflects our intuition that smaller firms, having
smaller inframarginal losses from additional sales in the primary market,
would like to "free ride" on the voluntary (unconstrained) restraint of large
firms.
The second element of this structure we refer to as scaling: by inspection
of (4) it is clear that the profits of any two constrained handlers are
monotonically increasing linear transformations of each other. Therefore,
if F and F' are two candidate choices and if in equilibrium firms i andj
are constrained at both F and F', the two firms will rank the candidates
in the same way. In brief, the ordinal preferences of all constrained handlers
are the same.
The third property we refer to as consistency. It requires that ni(F) =
nt (F,), and it follows immediately from (4) and the definition of F.
Finally, the induced preferences have the property that each uncon-
strained handler prefers tighter restraints on its constrained rivals. We
refer to this property as "unconstrained monotonicity"; it says that ni(F)
is monotone decreasing in F throughout the range [F,, 1]. Indeed, each
firm's profit is continuous in F, and decreasing in F, when the firm is
unconstrained.
These properties follow from the observation that the unconstrained
firms are playing a symmetric Cournot quantity game. As Spence (1976),
Loury (1986). and Bergstrom and Varian (1985) have remarked, Nash
equilibria of symmetric games can sometimes be represented as extreme
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points of "potential functions." In this case, if there are k unconstrained
firms, the unique Cournot equilibrium total primary market sales by the
unconstrained firms can be characterized as the unique maximizer of
(k - 1 )CS(Q - F) + kir(Q : F), where CS(Q: F) is consumer surplus and
n(Q: F) is the total revenue earned by the unconstrained firms on their
primary market sales. Both of these are computed using the "residual
demand curve" P(Q : F) = P(Q + FQ,4). This formulation shows clearly
that the Cournot equilibrium associated with a smaller F's is less competi-
tive and also that increases in the number of unconstrained firms result in
more competitive outcomes for a given F.
Since the range of F is compact and the profit functions are continuous
in F, it follows that each firm i has an ideal or most-preferred value of F,
which we denote by I. It is straightforward to show that handlers in the
industry with larger endowments prefer smaller allotment percentages.
More precisely, if q, < q 2 < ''' < q, J1 2. I,. For if q, < q;, then
F> F, and (by monotonicity) either i <F," s<F or F 1 I < F . In the
former case I = ;(by scaling), and in the latter Is;I.
The behavior of firms as F tightens is illustrated in figure 8.2 for the
duopoly case. The first panel shows the two firms' unconstrained reaction
functions. The unconstrained Nash equilibrium sales vector is located at
their unique point of intersection, which is labeled a. In addition we have
shown the endowment point, labeled q. As F tightens, the rectangle of
length Fq1 and height Fq2, within which y must lie, shrinks. Note that since
q2 > q1, the ray to the endowment point is steeper than the 45* line. As F
falls, the maximum amounts that can be sold on the primary market move
down this ray. From this, we can see that firm I (the smaller firm) is the
first to become constrained, illustrating the nesting property described
earlier. The allotment percentage at which firm I is just constrained is
labeled F, in the figure.
The second panel shows the reaction curves for values of F where firm 1
is constrained. As F tightens, it is clear that the equilibrium sales vector
moves up the unconstrained reaction curve of firm 2 until it meets the ray
to the endowment point at F2 q. This segment is labeled b. As Ffalls further,
both handlers are constrained, and the vector of equilibrium sales in the
primary market moves down the ray. The second panel also indicates the
isoprofit curve for each packinghouse, through the equilibrium point. As
figure 8.2 illustrates, locally movement along b (as F falls) benefits the
unconstrained firm. This illustrates the property of "unconstrained mo-
notonicity." The final two panels illustrate the possibilities when both firms
are constrained: it is possible that both firms will benefit (or be harmed)
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Mutually Profitable Constraint Divisive Constraint
Figure 8.2 Industry equilibrium under marketing orders in the two-handler case
y,
Y+
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from tightening F, but it is also possible that only the larger firm will find
this profitable.
Preferences Derived for an Example
The following example illustrates that the induced preferences derived in
the previous section need not be single peaked even when inverse demand
is linear:
P(Y)=a-bY. (5)
Substituting this inverse demand curve into the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
(1) through (3), we obtain for each i:
yv=0 and a-bY-c<O, (1')
y e[O,qiFJ and a - bY--by- c = 0, or (2')
y,=q;F and a-bY--c>0. (3')
We have already argued that (I') never holds in equilibrium. Conditions
(2') and (3') characterize the unconstrained and constrained firms, re-
spectively. From (2'), the primary sales of each unconstrained handler
will be
v=y=(a - bY -c)y = = - for all iE U(F). (6)
b
Consider the unique equilibrium associated with F. If there are k con-
strained firms and n - k unconstrained firms, aggregate sales in the pri-
mary market will be
(n -k)(a -c)+bFQk
Y*(F)=(nk)y+QF bn-k+l . (7)
Hence the primary market sales of each unconstrained firm will be
a - c -- bFQk(8
Y( -b~n - k +l()( )
We can use this expression to find the allotment percentage F that is
just binding on firm k. Since y"(F) = Faga,
F = a-c (9)
k b[(n - k + 1)qk + Qkj
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It is clear from this expression that the cutoffs have the nesting property
derived previously:I'
F, F2 2-- F,.
We now turn to the properties of the equilibrium quantities and the
induced preferences. First, it will be noticed that even in the general case
the preferences of the constrained and unconstrained firms can be written:
ni(F) = [P(Y*(F)) - c]qiF + cq1, (1Oa)
ir."(F) = [P(Y*(F)) - c]y"(F) + cq1. (1Ob)
Combining (5) and (2'), we have
P(F) - c = by"(F). (11)
From (8) it is clear that y"(F) and hence P(F) are decreasing and
piecewise linear in F. Moreover the limit (from either above or below) of
y"(F) as F-+ Fk is
y."(F) - (a - c)qk 12
[(n-- k+ 1)q + Q,]b)
As F falls below F and the number of constrained firms rises from k - 1
to k, (8) implies that the slope of yu(F), and therefore of P(F), becomes
more negative. To summarize, we have established that both the price and
the unconstrained sales functions are continuous, piecewise linear, mono-
tone decreasing, and convex in F. In fact they strictly decrease for F < F,.
These properties are illustrated in figure 8.3.
With these preliminaries established, we can consider the properties of
the induced preferences. If the ith packinghouse is unconstrained (F F),
we can write its profits using (10b) and (11) as
nT(F) = b(y"(F)) 2 + cq. (13)
From the properties of y"(F), it is evident that ir'(F) is continuous, de-
creasing and (since it is the sum of a constant and the composition of
convex functions) convex in F.
On the other hand, if the ith packinghouse is constrained (F < F), we
can write its profits as
ni (F) = by"(F) Fq, + cq. (14)
This is the sum of a constant and a negative definite (concave) quadratic
in F. It is therefore continuous and, on each open interval (F+1,, F ),




Equilibrium -- -- - -
- - -- -
Quantitytt
0 FS F4 F3 F2 F, 1 F
Figure 8.3 Price and unconstrained sales in the prirnary market as functions of F
continuously differentiable and strictly concave. On such intervals, its




Since y" is convex it follows that the slope of n (F) increases as F increases
through any boundary (F). As a result n '(F) need not be single peaked.
However, since both P( Y(F)) and y" (F) are continuous, i (F) is con-
tinuous in F.
Tables 8.2 through 8.5 numerically evaluate the induced preferences in
the linear demand case for illustrative markets with three handlers. As the
table headings indicate, the simulations differ with respect to individual
endowments, parameters of the linear demand curve, and the price in the
secondary market. To confirm that induced preferences need not be single
peaked, consider the fourth and fifth columns of table 8.3. When F first
binds on the smallest firm (F = F), n 1 = 25.781. As F tightens, n 1 falls.
When F just binds on the largest finn (F = Fa), n i =. 25.669. Still tighter
F's, however, cause n i to reverse direction and increase. It then begins to
decrease again. The reader can verify that the preferences for the. handler
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Table 8.2 Monopoly outcome with identical endowments
Demand parameters: A = 10; B = 2; C = 5
Endowments: 6.6667; 6.6667; 6.6667
F y P niP , 2  n3
Nash 1.00 0.625 6.25 34.115 34.115 34.115
0.2750 0.625 6.25 34.115 34.115 34.115
F = F2 = F3  0.0938 0.625 6.25 34.115 34.115 34.115
0.0750 - 7.00 34.334 34.334 34.334
MB = JM 0.0625 - 7.50 34.375 34.375 34.375
0.000 - 10 33.333 33.333 33.333
F = allotment; maximum fraction permitted on primary market
y" = fresh market sales of each unconstrained handler (if any)
P = price in primary market (P = A - BQ)
n, = profit of agent i
C = price in secondary market
F = allotment at which firm i becomes constrained
MB= marketing board equilibrium-ideal point of firm 2
JM = joint monopoly-industry profit-maximizing allotment.
Table 8.3 Moderate diversity in endowments
Demand parameters: A = 10; B = 2; C = 5
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F = allotment; maximum fraction permitted on primary market
y" = fresh market sales of each unconstrained handler (if any)
P = price in primary market (P = A - BQ)
n, = profit of agent i
C = price in secondary market
F = allotment at which firm i becomes constrained
MB = marketing board equilibrium-ideal point of firm 2
JM = joint monopoly-industry profit-maximizing allotment.
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Table 8.4 A committee dominated by small independents
Demand parameters: A = 10; B = 2; C = 5
Endowments: 1.0; 2.0, 17.0
F 1" P it, n n,
Nash 1.0000 0.625 6.25 5.781 10.781 85.781
F, 0.6250 0.625 6.25 5.781 10.781 85.781
0.5714 0.643 6.29 5.735 10.826 85.826
0.5179 0.661 6.32 5.684 10.873 85.873
0.4643 0.679 6.36 5.630 10.921 85.921
0.4107 0.696 6.39 5.572 10.970 85.970
F2 = MB 0.3571 0.714 6.43 5.510 11.020 86.020
0.2992 0.801 6.60 5.479 10.959 86.284
0.2413 0.888 6.78 5.429 10.857 86.577
0.1834 0.975 6.95 5.358 10.715 86.901
0.1255 1.062 7.12 5.266 10.533 87.255
F3  0.0676 1.148 7.30 5.155 10.310 87.639
JM 0.0625 - 7.50 5.156 10.312 87.656
0.0000 - 10.0 5.000 10.000 85.000
F = allotment; maximum fraction permitted on primary market
y = fresh market sales of each unconstrained handler (if any)
P = price in primary market (P = A - BQ)
n, = profit of agent i
C = price in secondary market
F = allotment at which firm i becomes constrained
MB = marketing board equilibrium-ideal point of firm 2
JM = joint monopoly-industry profit-maximizing allotment
with the intermediate endowment (ir2) are likewise not single peaked.
Nevertheless, as we prove later, the preferences have sufficient structure
to avoid Condorcet cycles and ensure the existence of a majority-rule
equilibrium.
Voting Equilibrium and its Properties
From the induced preferences of each packinghouse over committee deci-
sions, we turn now to the committee's determination of the allotment
percentage. Recall that committees are typically composed of a small
number of growers and handlers who serve for fixed terms of several years.
At the time the committee votes each grower's crop has been assigned to
the packinghouse of his choice,' and his costs are sunk. Alternative
proposals for the allotment percentage are voted on until one meets with
the approval of a majority of the committee.
To proceed, we make two strategic simplifications: each voter is assumed
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Table 8.5 Consequences of reduced price in secondary market
Demand parameters: A = 10: B = 2: C = 3
Endowments: 1.0: 2.0: 17.0
F y" P n, n2 n
Nash 1.0000 0.875 4.75 4.531 7.531 52.531
F 0.8750 0.875 4.75 4.531 7.531 52.531
0.8000 0.900 4.80 4.440 7.620 52.620
0.7250 0.925 4.85 4.341 7.711 52.711
0.6500 0.950 4.90 4.235 7.805 52.805
0.5750 0.975 4.95 4.121 7.901 52.901
F, = MB 0.5000 1.000 5.00 4.000 8.000 53.000
0.4189 1.122 5.24 3.940 7.879 53.516
0.3378 1.243 5.49 3.840 7.680 54.091
0.2568 1.365 5.73 3.701 7.402 54.726
0.1757 1.486 5.97 3.522 7.045 55.419
F3  0.0946 1.608 6.22 3.304 6.608 56.172
J.M 0.0875 - 6.50 3.306 6.613 56.206
0.0000 - 10.0 3.000 6.000 51.000
F = allotment; maximum fraction permitted on primary marketV" = fresh market sales of each unconstrained handler (if any)
P = price in primary market (P = A - BQ)
it, = profit of agent i
C = price in secondary market
F = allotment at which firm i becomes constrained
MB = marketing board equilibrium-ideal point of firm 2
JMA = joint monopoly-industry profit-maximizing allotment
to disregard the future interactions he will have with other members of the
committee, and contracts between a grower and his packinghouse give
them coincident preferences over alternative allotment percentages. These
are strong assumptions, and we make them at this preliminary stage to
simplify a complex problem. If the evidence suggests they are inappropri-
ate, we will modify them in subsequent work. In the orders with which we
are most familiar (e.g., the citrus orders), the board lasts for a fixed
duration and then is replaced in its entirety. In such cases, as long as there
is no interseasonal interaction, voting behavior in each stage of the multi-
stage game should coincide with behavior in the one-shot game. This (and
its simplicity) motivate our first assumption.1 As for the second, in the
vast majority of fruit and vegetable markets, the contracts between growers
and packinghouses involve "pools." 19 As we understand such pools, the
packinghouse deducts a percentage of its gross revenues to cover its costs
and divides the residual among the growers according to the size of the
crop each grower has assigned to the packinghouse. For such contracts
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our second assumption would be appropriate; other contracts of course
exist for which grower and packinghouse interests diverge.20 The practical
implication of the second assumption is that the preferences and endow-
ments of each grower can be taken to be those of his packinghouse. If we
find inexplicable differences between the voting behavior of growers and
handlers on the committee, we will reconsider this assumption.
In what follows, we consider the determination of the allotment percen-
tage by the administrative committee. At the time of voting, the composi-
tion of the committee is fixed as is the size of each grower's crop and his
choice of packinghouse. We treat these variables as exogenous to the
problem under investigation, recognizing that they could be incorporated
in a more complex model.21 We assume there are an odd number (L) of
committee members chosen from the industry of n (> L) firms. To avoid
confusion, we assign a "committee index" (i = 1, 2,... .L) to each voter in
addition to his "industry index." A larger committee index of a voter
indicates a larger endowment. The index we will refer to will be the
committee index unless otherwise indicated. The preferences of each of the
L voters have the same general characteristics as the preferences of mem-
bers of the industry from which they are selected.
Assume that there are an odd number of voters and that their en-
dowments differ. Let the committee index m denote the voter with the
median endowment. Let us recall the following properties of the induced
preferences:
1. The firms are numbered in (strictly) increasing order of size.
2. The cutoff levels (F, i = 1.2,... , L) below which firm i is constrained in
Nash equilibrium are ranked in decreasing order of size (nesting).
3. Profits of the unconstrained firms are monotone decreasing in F on the
relevant range [F, 1] (unconstrained montonicity).
4. Profits of the constrained firms are increasing linear transformations of
each other (scaling).
5. The profits of each firm i are continuous in F(continuity).
Under these conditions it is easy to demonstrate the following result.
MEDIAN PACKINGHOUSE THEOREM There is a unique majority-rule equili-
brium at ., the ideal point of the committee member with the median
endowment.
Proof The formal content of this theorem is that, for any F, the number
of voters preferring 1, to Fis at least (L + 1)/2. The proof is in three steps.
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By continuity, each voter i (i = 1,2,..., L) has an ideal point I, and
unconstrained monotonicity implies that I. <F;22 each voter's ideal point
comes at a point where he is constrained. Combining this with the scaling
property, we can see that if the ideal point of a small firm is smaller than
the cutoff level of a larger firm, those two firms-and all firms of inter-
mediate size-have the same ideal point. We refer to this property as..congruence given nesting."
Second, if F < I., the set of firms constrained at Fincludes the majority
coalition{l, ... , m}. All the voters in this coalition are also constrained at
I, so from the scaling property we know that they will agree as to the
ranking of F and I~. But I, is preferred by m to F. This shows that such
an F would lose to I, in pairwise voting.
Finally, consider the only remaining possibility: that F,~+k s <1.
min (F.l, F} for some positive integer k. The set of firms unconstrained
at F and at I, includes the set {m + k, . .. , L}, so every member of this set
prefers I, to F by unconstrained monotonicity. By the congruence prop-
erty, I, is also the ideal point of every voter in {n,..., m + k - 1 }, and
thus each member of this set prefers I, to F. Therefore every voter in the
majority coalition {m,..., L} prefers 4, to F. Hence for any F, 4, wins in
pairwise voting. a
To illustrate, the preferences for a three-voter case are drawn in figure
8.4. Note that F1 > F2 > F3 , reflecting the assumption that q1 < q2 <q3.
Note also that voter i's preference is monotonically decreasing in F for
F > F, and that the collection of preferences has the "scaling" property.
The theorem therefore implies that the ideal point of the median voter (I2)
will be strictly preferred by a majority of the committee. Voter 3 would
join voter 2 in defeating proposals for any larger F, while voter 1 would
join voter 2 in defeating proposals for any smaller F. Hence even without
single-peaked preferences. a majority-rule cycle is avoided.
The escape is a narrow one, however. If the "scaling" property did not
hold a cycle could easily be produced. Suppose in figure 8.4 that 7r2 and n'
were as drawn but n i were modified so that a'n(I') > ( > n'(12 ). Then
I, would no longer defeat 13, and since f1 defeats 13 and 12 defeats !1, there
would be no equilibrium.
Our theory does admit the possibility that the committee will vote for
the restriction that maximizes industry profits. This would occur, for
example, if handlers had identical endowments and hence had no conflicts
of interest. But our theory also admits more competitive possibilities. These
should arise when heterogeneity among the handlers creates conflicts of
interest.




OF 3 2 F,1 F
Figure 8.4 Induced preferences: not single peaked but sufficient for median voter result
The theory implies that whenever the committee does choose the mono-
poly restriction, each handler will sell as much as he is permitted on the
primary market. Suppose in such circumstances some handler sold a
smaller quantity on the primary market. Since monopoly price on the
primary market would exceed the (fixed) price in the secondary market by
the inframarginal loss, an additional primary sale would inflict on the
profits of the entire industry, any unconstrained individual handler would
have an incentive to increase his primary market sales. If the real-world
conformed exactly to the assumptions of our model, then the mere evidence
that some handlers sold less than they were permitted on the primary
market would establish unambiguously that industry profits were not
being maximized under the order and that the regulation was more com-
petitive than is commonly supposed.2 3
Why would a committee composed of handlers and growers from the
industry fail to maximize industry profits? Intuitively, the committee would
select a restriction that does not maximize the profits of its members if a
majority of them would lose-albeit a smaller amount than remaining
members would gain-under the profit-maximizing restriction.
Given the vector of industry endowments and the demand parameters.
the economic equilibrium will depend on the composition of the commit-
tee. It is instructive to regard the industry's handlers as a fixed set of
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preferences indexed by their endowments and the committee as some
selection from this set (subject to restrictions contained in the order). Any
committee whose median voter has a given endowment will vote for the
same restriction no matter what is the composition of the rest of the
committee.
As was previously shown, handlers in the industry with larger endow-
ments prefer smaller allotment percentages. This suggests that industries
governed by marketing orders can be made more competitive by replacing
a board member whose endowment exceeds the committee's median by a
member whose endowment lies below it. Such changes will lower the
endowment of the median voter and will cause the committee to relax its
regulation. The analysis implies moreover that there is nothing to be gained
by adding a voter with an exceptionally small endowment. The greatest
relaxation that can be accomplished by a single replacement is a new
equilibrium at the ideal point of the current committee member with
committee index m - 1.
By selecting committees of alternative composition, a broad range of
equilibria can be generated. The largest (smallest) such F would be selected
by a committee composed of the smallest (largest) L firms in the industry;
they would choose the ideal point of the firm with industry index (L + 1)/2
(alternatively, n - (L - 1)/2). Notice that the induced preferences over F
are entirely independent of the makeup of the committee. They reflect the
distribution of endowments across all the firms affected by the marketing
order regulation.
One characteristic of all such voting equilibria is that a majority of the
committee must be constrained. For if a majority were unconstrained,
there would exist a tighter constraint, which it would vote for, and the
initial situation could not have been an equilibrium.
In any event no matter how the committee members are selected, it is
not possible for the "joint-monopoly" outcome to be selected unless it
happens to be the ideal point of firm n - (L - 1)/2. This implies that
substantial asymmetry in the distribution of endowments precludes fully
collusive behavior, provided the voting procedure fits our description and
side payments between the firms are prohibited.
Indeed, our model suggests that marketing boards will select more
competitive outcomes in highly concentrated industries. By contrast, most
theories of unregulated oligopoly in which structure matters suggest that
concentration leads to greater departures from competitive equilibrium.
This in turn suggests that marketing boards may have more attractive
welfare properties in highly concentrated industries. If marketing boards
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create long-term pressures for reduced concentration, they may remove
both the symptom (collusion) and the cause (high concentration) of market
failures.
In our analysis we have explicitly excluded side payments from con-
sideration. In addition we have implicitly assumed sincere voting: in other
words, we assume that each voter's behavior is an accurate reflection of
its induced preferences. Due to the fact that preferences of constrained
voters fail to be single peaked, it may not be obvious that sincere voting is
a dominant strategy. What is obvious is that misrepresentation that does
not displace the median voter will have no effect on the outcome. Firms
that are smaller (larger) than the median firm therefore may have the power
to tighten (loosen) the constraint by voting as if they were larger (smaller)
than the median firm. However, from the properties of unconstrained
monotonicity and scaling, it is evident that a smaller (larger) firm will only
profit if it can arrange to loosen (tighten) the constraint. Thus the only
changes a firm can effect are those that do not improve the outcome. It
follows that sincere voting is at least a Nash equilibrium in that a firm
faced with sincere voting by other committee members cannot profit by
misrepresentation.
Future Research
In the next phase of this project, the predictive power of our theory will be
investigated using a combination of controlled experiments and an analysis
of data on committee voting and handler sales drawn from the hops. navel
orange, or filbert markets. Here we outline the planned research.
Experiments
Plott (1979) studied the voting behavior of a committee of five individuals
required to make a succession of twelve decisions. To pass, a proposal
required the approval of a majority. On each of the twelve rounds prefer-
ences were induced for each individual by offering him a payment depen-
dent on the committee's decision in that round. In Plott's experiment the
issue space was two dimensional. Each voter's indifference curves were
concentric circles around a specified ideal point. Plott found that if there
existed a Condorcet winner for a particular stage, the committee almost
always chose it at that stage. He reported no evidence of sophisticated
voting and no evidence of interdependence between votes on successive
rounds.
We plan to conduct three types of experiments to test the predictive
J. Cave and S. W. Salant 278
power of our model. First, we intend to examine the voting behavior of a
committee whose preferences are induced directly by the experimenter as
in Plott's case. Our experiment would differ from his in two principal
respects: the issue space would be one dimensional and preferences would
be asymmetric. Specifically, we plan to use the nonsingle-peaked prefer-
ences derived from our linear demand case. Like Plott, we will examine the
behavior of a committee that votes on a succession of issues to see if it
tends to select the Condorcet winner at each stage.
The second type of experiment will concern the behavior of handlers in
a regulated market. Specifically, each subject will be given an endowment
to allocate between two outlets (referred to as "markets") but will be
allowed to designate no more than a common exogenous percentage of
that endowment for the more lucrative primary market. Participants will
be paid by the experimenter as follows: a fixed reward for each unit
designated for the secondary market and a per unit reward that decreases
linearly in the total amount that all subjects designate for the primary
market. Our goal here will be to examine the validity of the theoretical
prediction that subjects will behave like Cournot competitors.
The third type of experiment will involve two stages. Participants in the
market experiment will be asked first to form a committee for the purpose
of deciding collectively on a common allotment percentage. Before they
vote, however, they will be told that this percentage will restrict behavior
in the market experiments to follow and that the experimenter will pay
subjects exactly as before (i.e., according to what they designate for the
two markets). Unlike the previous type of voting experiment, in this last
experiment the reward to each individual from the alternative committee
decisions is indirect. The experimenter does not reward him directly for
alternative decisions of the committee; instead, the experimenter's reward
depends on the outcome in the subsequent stage. However, that outcome
will be influenced (in ways that differ across subjects) by the common
constraint. The premise of the theory is that each subject will take this
influence into account when voting. The experiment will be designed to
permit a clear distinction between the predictions of our theory and that
of the alternative in which the allocation between the two markets maxi-
mizes the total payoff of the subjects.
Experiments such as these will permit us to determine if subjects behave
as the theory predicts. If they do not, the claim that marketing boards
behave this way in the "naturally-occurring" world would seem question-
able. If, however, the experimental evidence is consistent with the theory,
questions will of course persist about the applicability of the theory to
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naturally-occurring marketing orders. To resolve such questions, an analy-
sis will be undertaken of data on the voting behavior of real-world mar-
keting boards and the sales decisions of real-world handlers.
Analysis of Real-World Data
As table 8.1 reflects, the USDA collects data for each order on the allowed
and actual sales of each handler. It is clear from the aggregate data that
some handlers sell less than their allotments. Our theory predicts that it is
the larger packinghouses (identifiable since their allotments are larger)
which will sell less than their allowed amount." We hope to secure dis-
aggregated data from USDA for various orders so that we can examine
this hypothesis.
We also plan to analyze the voting behavior of members of a marketing
committee. The minutes indicate how each board member voted on each
proposal (whether it passed or not). It is easy to ascertain the affiliation of
each board member. In most cases the packinghouse that each voter
represents publishes an annual report from which information on the
"endowment" of the packinghouse can be obtained. As for the distribution
of endowments in the rest of the industry, this information can be obtained
from the USDA data referred to earlier. We hope to use this information
to test our model.
No matter which order we choose to examine, however, we anticipate
that some serious questions will arise concerning the applicability of our
model. Take the citrus orders as an example. In each committee, several
voters represent packinghouses belonging to Sunkist growers. Each such
packinghouse is regulated individually. But does each packinghouse allo-
cate its endowment autonomously in its own interest or is it directed from
above? We have been told by a packinghouse representative we interviewed
that such decisions are made at the local level, and the president of Sunkist
independently confirmed this. But is this information accurate? Even if
sales decisions are made at the local level, a representative from a local
Sunkist packinghouse may cast his vote in a way that serves the interest of
Sunkist as a whole rather than that of his particular packinghouse. Despite
assurances from Sunkist that such voters represent their local packing-
houses as we have assumed. it may still be reasonable to question this.
A second questionable assumption concerns the failure of the voters to
anticipate that this year's allotment percentage may affect next year's
production. A third concerns the fact that committee members may come
from different geographical areas with different seasonal characteristics
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and possibly different qualities of produce. The list could easily be ex-
panded indefinitely.
In any of these cases the theory could be modified to handle the real-
world complication. But if inability to predict can always be attributed to
failures to resolve such problems, the basic theory will never be tested. The
great merit of controlled experiments is that they permit a test of the basic
theory. If the theory fails to predict well in the controlled environment,
we would not expect it to predict better in the uncontrolled one. If,
however, it predicts well in the experiments, then a failure to predict well
on naturally-occurring data would lead us to examine more closely ques-
tionable assumptions such as those we have mentioned here.
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Varian. Stephen Salant's research was supported by the National Science Foundation pro-
gram on Political Science (Grant No. 8696084).
I. The reasons for such terminations have been studied by Camm (1976) and Hallagan (1985).
2. For a ranking of various orders by their social cost, see Lenard and Mazur (1985).
3. The two crops listed in table 8.1 are regulated by producer allotments. Similar divergences
occur, however, under market allocation schemes and under prorates. In the 1983-84 season,
for example. tilbert handlers shipped substantially less in the primary "in-shell" market than
their allotments permitted under the market allocations, and handlers of navel oranges from
District 2 typically sold less than their allotments -under the prorate. The reasons for the
observed divergences may partially depend on the particular order. We hypothesize, however,
that among the reasons is the concern of relatively large handlers that additional sales would
depress the price in the primary market and would result in more than offsetting inframarginal
losses.
4. A particularly useful. annotated bibliography for the years 1940 to 1981 is contained in
USDA (1981).
5. Camm (1976), Masson. Masson. and Harris (1978), and Lenard and Mazur (1985) may be
newed as representative of such treatments.
6 For a discussion of the controversy, see Samuelson (1985) or New York Times (1985). The
leading opponent of the navel order, Carl Pescosolido, will benefit in the long run from
elimination of the order because water costs in the San Joaquin Valley, where he operates,
are dramatically lower than elsewhere (see Rausser 1971, p. 118, on these costs).
Conflicts among districts are also serious. For example, many handlers in Central Califor-
nia (District 1) feel that the existing regulations are inequitable because they ignore the
differential advantage of handlers in Southern California (District 2) to sell fresh fruit in the
unregulated export market.
K. There is evidence that the committee tries to appear united after it has worked out a
compromise allotment. Clodius (1950. pp. 307-308) noted, for example. that "in the first
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wenty-one months of the federal program. determination by the Distribution committee of
he weekly shipments was based on unanimous agreement in more than 90 percent of the
Seeks. However, the determination was nearly always a compromise. despite the unanimous
ote supporting the final recommendation." This observation suggests that the final vote of
committee is less informative than prior votes and is intended to keep up appearances of
olidarity for the secretary of agriculture, who must approve the final recommendations of
-ach committee.
?. For an illustration of this common but unfortunate practice, see Lenard and Mazur (1985,
).20).
10. Actually, since price in the secondary market is fixed, nothing would change if we allowed
lemand in the primary market to depend as well on price in the secondary market.
I1. For example, since more than 98 percent of orange-juice concentrate comes from Florida.
t is reasonable that orange growers in California and Arizona regard the price in the
secondary (concentrate) market as unaffected by their sales. In general. of course the demand
in each market might be regarded as a function of both prices. Smith (1961) has emphasized
the importance of such demand interdependence. However, we have not yet fully explored
its consequences in our model.
12. The model may have other applications as well. For example. q; could be interpreted as
the productive capacity of firm i, and the constant c interpreted as a common marginal cost
of production. Indeed, this constant c could be replaced with generalized and possibly non-
symmetric opportunity cost functions C(x,) without necessarily vitiating the results. Cer-
tainly it is the case that if all firms share the same twice-differentiable convex cost function
all the qualitative results go through.
13. An alternative contract-allegedly the "typical" arrangement between independent han-
dlers and their growers-would instead award the packinghouse a commission that increases
monotonically with the volume sold on the domestic fresh market. Such a contract would
induce a handler to sell as much as possible on the domestic fresh market and --if he served
on the administrative committee-to vote for the least restrictive regulation possible. Such
contracts would create still another source of conflict within the committee and would
constitute an additional reason to question the conventional belief that the committee chooses
to maximize industry profits. Inclusion of this second form of contract would reinforce our
basic point but would also complicate the analysis: it will be considered in a subsequent
paper.
14. We assume that inverse demand P( Y) is everywhere nonnegative, monotone decreasing
and twice differentiable. Where price P( Y) is positive, we require that P'( Y he negative. To
ensure that positive quantities are sold on the primary market when F > 0, we assume that
P(0) > c. These assumptions suffice for existence. To ensure uniqueness, we assume that for
every feasible aggregate amount Y placed on the primary market and for every feasible
individual amount x < min { Y, q,,
[3P'(Y) +xP"( Y) _ 0.
15. This follows since marginal revenue in the secondary market is assumed to he constant
and marginal revenue in the primary market will be strictly decreasing in own sales gi.en the
final inequality in note 14.
16. It will also be noted that it is possible for F to exceed I for some or all k. This means that
the outputs of some or all firms are below the quantities they would wish to sell in the primary
market even in the absence of the marketittg order system.
17. We ignore the fact that a few growers use more than one packinghouse.
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18. Moreover our assumption about how a committee behaves when making a finite set of
decisions in sequence by majority-rule voting conforms with the experimental evidence
reported in Plott (1979).
19. See the National Commission on Food Marketing (1966, p. 270) for a discussion of these
"single-pool" systems.
20. See note 13.
21. How a self-interested, foresighted grower chooses a particular packinghouse for his crop
deserves some comment. Assume provisionally that each packinghouse is equidistant from
each grower and that each has the same convex cost of processing. In an equilibrium in which
growers had foresight, no grower would assign his crop to a shipper anticipated to be
unconstrained under the forthcoming allotment percentage. Such handlers would be so large
that they would have lower per-unit revenues. The fact that some packinghouses are uncon-
strained and do have customers (see table 8.1 and note 3) suggests that the preceding
assumption is inappropriate. In particular, a grower will tend to pick a packinghouse in his
immediate area because of transport and transactions costs. In our analysis we do not attempt
to explain why a particular packinghouse has a particular "endowment"; instead we take
such data as given.
22. The property of consistency is used to ensure that each handler is actually constrained at
his ideal point. If it were possible for ni to jump up as handler i just becomes unconstrained,
his ideal point could be exactly F, and yet he would not be constrained at that point.
23. In reality, of course, handlers sometimes sell less than their allotments for reasons not
included in our model and in such cases valid inferences cannot be drawn merely from the
evidence of undershipping. For example, navel handlers in District 2 have a differential
advantage in the lucrative but limited export market and typically sell much of their endow-
ment abroad. As a result their allotments often exceed what they ship to the regulated fresh
market.
24. In examining this hypothesis. care should be taken to control for district and contract
type, as discussed in notes 3 and 13.
25. Further assurance that Sunkist voters represent the disparate interests of their local
packinghouse comes from the USDA representative who attends each navel meeting. Ac-
cording to Roland Harris, it is not uncommon for representatives of different Sunkist
packinghouse to oppose each other in the voting. We plan to check this ourselves once we
obtain the voting data.
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